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Curious Cases of Dialogues, Fatwa >> >>s and Laws 
Andy Fuller1 
The University of Melbourne, Australia 
Abstract: Religious freedom is one of the most pressing 
issues in contemporary Indonesia. Over recent years, the 
Ahmadiyah sect has become increasingly targeted by 
violent and conservative groups within mainstream 
Indonesian society. Semi-official organisations such as the 
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) and community-based 
groups such as Front Pembela Islam have sought to isolate 
Ahmadis within Indonesian society. Ahmadis have had 
their homes attacked, their mosques closed, and in the 
most grievous instance, three Ahmadis have been killed. 
The state has been both present and absent throughout the 
recent rise in attacks made against Ahmadis. The state has 
proved to be a particularly ambivalent force. This article 
argues that calls for dialogues have failed to produce a 
necessary and positive outcome for Ahmadis. The article 
also shows how the 2005 fatwa > issued by the MUI and the 
SKB of 2008 have been used to further marginalise the 
Ahmadiyah movement. Despite the significant work of 
many intellectuals and activists being done in many sections 
of society, the author is not optimistic in contemplating 
future trends.  
Keywords: Religious freedom, fatwa >, dialogue, Ahmadiyah. 
Introduction 
This article looks at three main issues: dialogue, law and 
negotiation. These issues are related back to ideas of ‘religious 
                                          
1 Andy Fuller was a visiting research fellow at Freedom Institute (Jakarta) from January 
to March 2011. He is currently a post-doc fellow at KITLV, Leiden. He thanks 
Abdullah Saeed, Luthfi Assyaukanie, and Masdar Hilmy for their consultation in 
preparation for the writing of this article. Its flaws are his responsibility. An earlier 
version of this article was presented at IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, on 18 March 
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pluralism’ and ‘religious freedom’. These issues, in turn, are related to 
ideas of ‘tolerance’ and ‘intolerance’.2 The starting point for this article 
is the growing tensions within some sections of Indonesian society 
between members of various conservative (and sometimes violent) 
groups and members or followers of the Ahmadiyah sect. Although 
Ahmadiyah has two branches–Qadian and Lahore–commonly in 
Indonesia, little emphasis is given to the differences between these two 
groups of Ahmadiyah. Most often, the term ‘Ahmadiyah’ is used to 
refer to all-Ahmadis as if they all believe in the same matters; as if they 
are a monolithic group. Similar, acts of generalisation, are also made 
against Muslims in general.  
Indonesian society has undergone a rapid process of 
democratisation and decentralisation in the post-Suharto era. The 
impulse towards democratisation and decentralisation are efforts 
against countering the highly authoritarian and highly centralised 
governmental system of the New Order era. Moreover, this was a 
government that was particularly strict in enforcing rigid 
interpretations of national ideologies, such as the Pancasila, Bhinneka 
Tunggal Ika, and also the primacy of pembangunan (or, development). 
Although, reformasi (the student-led movement that helped bring about 
Suharto’s resignation in May 1998) has had mixed successes, one of the 
generally acknowledged achievements has been a climate of greater 
freedom of expression–indeed, this covers expression of one’s 
religious identity.  
Islamic identity, for example, was largely silenced throughout the 
New Order era, for, Islamism was considered as a possible threat to 
the national ideology of Pancasila–an ideology that acknowledges the 
importance of religious belief, but asserts that Indonesia is not 
beholden to a direct relationship between Islam and the State. 
Nonetheless, Indonesia’s national politics is tightly linked to issues of 
Islamic expression and identity. In the post-New Order era there has 
been a strong emergence of many kinds of Islamic voices: whether it 
be in mainstream politics, social groups that claim to be acting in the 
                                          
2 A recent ICG report writes of the rise of ‘intolerance’ – see ICG, Indonesia: 
Christianisation and Intolerance (Jakarta/Brussels, November 2010). Melissa Crouch’s 
article also positions recent developments in regards to ‘intolerance’. See, Melissa 
Crouch, “Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: A History of Religious Tolerance Under Threat?,” 
in AltLJ, vol.36, no.1 (2011): pp. 56-57.  
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name of Islam, and also, a rise in the popularity of Muslim fashion and 
popular culture.  
This article, therefore, looks at the different ways in which Islam 
and the state rub up against one another. Islamist forces (or impulses) 
and ‘the state’ are not necessarily two distinct groups, but have 
elements of crossover, as well as points of divergence. Two points of 
convergence and divergence can be found in that of the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Ulama Council) and the Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI, Defenders’ of Islam Front). For example, the MUI is 
increasingly endorsed by the government and President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, while the FPI, which generally acts outside the 
law (beyond the state), is to varying degrees receiving implicit support 
from the government. That is, little has been done to reign in their 
extra-legal activities. Moreover, their demands for banning Ahmadiyah 
have been accepted by various regional governments, such as East 
Java.  
While the FPI is not the only hard-line and vocal organisation that 
has spoken out against Ahmadiyah–and in some cases acted violently 
against its members–it perhaps is the most ‘popular’ of conservative 
movements, which can mobilise its supporters as well as capture 
headlines in national newspapers. The FPI also enjoys some degree of 
interaction with governmental representatives and the police.3 Both 
Jakarta’s governor, Fauzi Bowo and the chief of Jakarta’s police, Gen. 
Timur Pradopo attended the FPI’s ‘celebration’ of the 12th anniversary 
of FPI’s founding.4 At this occasion, FPI’s leader, Habib Riziek 
asserted that the ‘the state’ and the FPI were not enemies. Instead, the 
enemy of the FPI is ‘sin’. The closeness between the state and societal 
organisations (organisasi massa; ormas) is a relationship that is shifting 
and with unclear borders. Societal organisations, such as FPI, 
moreover, at times claim to be acting out the state’s demands, while, at 
other times, they can be seen to be threatening and challenging to the 
state. 
‘Indonesian Islam’ 
Indonesia is widely known to be a ‘tolerant’ and ‘pluralist’ society. 
Another statement made about Indonesia is that it is ‘the world’s most 
                                          
3 ICG, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah Decree (Jakarta/Brussels, 2008), p. 14. 
4 “Fauzi, Police Chief, Hobnob with FPI,” The Jakarta Post, 8 October, 2010.   
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populous Muslim country’. The differences between Muslims within 
Indonesia are often glossed over. Such a statement also allows for little 
ability to ‘measure’ the degree of religiosity amongst Indonesia’s 
Muslims. It is often a point of curiosity for some commentators that 
the high-percentage of Indonesia’s Muslim population does not 
necessarily correlate to the success or otherwise of Islamist political 
parties in Indonesia. That is, political parties that espouse strongly 
Islamist ideologies have generally not succeeded. Perhaps, however, 
perceptions of Indonesia are changing–as indeed, Indonesian society is 
changing. Perceptions of whether Indonesia is a ‘tolerant’ or 
‘conservative’ or ‘intolerant’ or ‘liberal’ Muslim society, however, 
depend on what one chooses to look at. If one looks at the statements 
of representatives of the MUI or the Ministery of Religious Affairs, it 
seems that there is an increasing degree of aggression towards groups 
that are considered to be ‘deviant’. On the other hand, if one reads the 
views of scholars and intellectuals in large volumes such as Budhy 
Munawar-Rachman’s book, Membela Kebebasan Beragama (Defending 
Religious Freedom)5, it seems that there remains a high degree of 
advocacy for religious pluralism. What ‘Islam’ is in Indonesia and 
whether or not it ‘is’ something in particular, is subject to much 
contestation.  
Formulations of ‘Indonesian Islam’ or ‘Muslims in Indonesia’ are 
very much contingent upon which kind of ‘Indonesian Islam’ one 
considers, or who are the ‘Muslims in Indonesia’ one chooses to 
engage with. In the wake of anti-Ahmadiyah violence in Banten, and 
attacks on churches in Temanggung, Tim Lindsey states that 
Islam in Indonesia is still overwhelmingly extraordinarily 
tolerant. Extraordinarily moderate and very open. But you 
wouldn’t know it, reading the newspapers, not just 
internationally, but in Indonesia as well.6 
                                          
5 Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang 
Sekularisme, Liberalisme, Pluralisme (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2010).  
6 “Interview with Prof. Tim Lindsey,” Up Close, The University of Melbourne (See 
http://upclose.unimelb.edu.au/episode/episode-139-muslim-publics-divided-encoun-
ters-anti-pluralism-democratic-indonesia#transcription).  
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Organisations such as the Setara Institute7 and The Wahid Institute, 
however, in their recent yearly reports, have shown the rapid and 
strong increase in acts of intolerance and violence towards religious 
minorities. Moreover, these acts made against religious freedom have 
also been performed by the state, or received the implicit support of 
the state.8  
Killings and Dialogues 
In the wake of the February 2011 attacks against Ahmadis, many 
intellectuals have called for a dialogue (dialog) between the members of 
Ahmadiyah and groups–such as Front Pembela Islam. Attacks have 
been made against the property of Ahmadis, their mosques, their 
houses, and most seriously against individuals. The killings of three 
Ahmadis in Cikeusik (Banten province in western Java) is one of the 
moments that has caused much controversy between advocates of 
religious pluralism and those who advocate the authenticity and 
truthfulness of a particular interpretation of Islamic doctrines. The 
discourses as carried out in the mainstream press in Indonesia 
represents a significant moment in a negotiation between ‘the state’ 
and ‘society’, between ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘deviancy’ and between 
‘religious authorities’ and ‘the laity’. The contestation of ‘Islam’ is also 
one of competing ‘orthodoxies’–just as the MUI reject Ahmadiyah for 
its ‘divergence’, an Ahmadiyah practice rejects mainstream Sunni 
Islam.9  
In other instances, some commentators have emphasised the 
legality of citizens to practice their religion in the manner that they 
choose.10 The practice of dialogue and the enforcement of particular 
                                          
7 See, for example, their reports on the ‘conditions of religious freedom’ in Indonesia; 
the radicalisation of religion in Jabodetabek and West Java as well as in urban regions: 
http://www.setara-institute.org/category/category/reports 
8 The Wahid Institute, Laporan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan dan Toleransi 2010 
(Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2010).  
9 Lilik Rofiqoh, “The Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the Ahmadiyah 
Doctrines: The Problems of Religious Authority and Tolerance” (Leiden University, 
Unpublished MA Thesis, 2008).  
10 Bonar Tigor Naipospos and Robertus Robert (eds), Beragama, Berkeyakinan & 
Berkonstitusi; Tinjauan Konstitusional Praktik Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan di Indonesia 
(Jakarta: The Setara Institute, 2009); Ahmad Suaedy, Rumadi, M. Subhi Azhari and 
Badrus Samsul Fata, Islam, Konstitusi dan Hak Asasi Manusia: Problematika Hak Kebebasan 
Beragama dan Berkeyakinan di Indonesia (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2009).  
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laws, however, will not necessarily bring about the easy resolution to 
conflicts between groups such as FPI and a religious minority such as 
Ahmadiyah. Dialogues and laws also offer the opportunity for some to 
further their will upon others. These are also kinds of violence – that 
operate in the realms of discourse and legality. The close relationship 
between acts of discourse and acts of violence is something that has 
been argued by Luthfi Assyaukanie in his article, “Fatwa and Violence 
in Indonesia”.11  
Dialogue is a kind of discourse in which an exchange of ideas, 
feelings, beliefs and perspectives can be shared. A dialogue is opposed 
to that of a monologue: in which there is only one active voice, or 
speaker. Dialogues are seemingly egalitarian and provide opportunities 
for different interest groups to be heard and to represent themselves. 
Dialogue is also being used in Indonesian language newspapers. 
Although a ‘dialogue’ is a welcomed alternative to physical violence, a 
dialogue is not without its own pitfalls and needs to be judged on its 
own merits. It is worth questioning, for example, as to who 
participates in the dialogue and for what ends. A dialogue is not 
something that can be forced to take place. Dialogues also present an 
opportunity to perform a kind of discursive violence: a violence, which 
even if only spoken, still rejects the other participants in the dialogue.  
Franz Magnis-Suseno provides an overview of the ‘dialogue’ 
experience in Indonesia in the following way: 
There are a great number of dialogues going on among 
Indonesian intellectuals about moral-political questions. 
Indonesia has travelled through a history full of ups and 
downs, facing great problems, and always coming out a 
little better. Thus things to talk about abound: national 
identity, the crucial, partly tragic points in the nations [sic] 
history, including terrible violations of human rights, the 
questions of Islam (brought up by Muslims), democracy, 
liberalism, social justice, humanism, revolution and legality, 
state and religions, the question of the Islamic state, 
republicanism, amendments of the constitution, neo-
liberalism, globalisation, socialism, national sovereignty 
versus internationalization, Indonesian versus local culture, 
position of the Javanese (who are politically and cultural 
                                          
11 Luthfi Assyaukanie, “Fatwa and Violence in Indonesia,” Journal of Religion and Society, 
Vol. 11 (2009): pp. 1-29.  
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dominant) in Indonesia, religious freedom, proselytism 
(“kristianisasi”).12  
As Magnis-Suseno writes, dialogues, discussions and debates 
abound. There is a lively discussion of a range of issues on television 
stations, in newspapers and magazines, on websites, in universities, in 
public forums. The question of who is participating and which 
questions are being asked, however, are the measuring stick of whether 
or not a dialogue is successful. Magnis-Suseno, however, is an optimist, 
for he sees hope in silaturahmi (‘making acquaintance’) even with 
‘unbending hardliners’ as they may have ‘long term positive effects’.13  
On the other hand, Fatimah Husein has criticised the Indonesian 
government’s attempts at implementing inter-religious dialogue. 
Husein acknowledges that the government has held dialogues, but that 
these have mainly been responses to conflicts.14 As such, this point 
corresponds to what has happened in the wake of the violent acts 
against Ahmadis. In making an argument for how the government can 
implement more successful dialogues, Husein argues as follows: 
First, rather than emphasizing the “unity” and pretending 
that there is no conflict between religious believers, the 
government should address the root causes of disharmony 
faced by those religious communities…Second, the 
government itself should “refrain from becoming the 
perpetrator of violence (or escalation of conflicts) either by 
making official statements or policies that would be 
counter-productive to the dialogue’s aims or through weak 
law enforcements.”15  
Many commentators emphasise the difference between orthodox 
Sunni belief and that of the Ahmadis, while there is little 
acknowledgment of commonality and sources for potential ‘unity’ 
                                          
12 Franz Magnis-Suseno, “Interreligious Dialog: Indonesian Experiences,” in Richard 
Potz, Sabine Kroissenbrunner and Astrid Hafner (eds), State, Law and Religion in 
Pluralistic Societies – Austrian and Indonesian Experiences (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 
2010), p. 33. 
13 Magnis-Suseno, “Interreligious Dialog,” p. 40. 
14 Fatimah Husein, “State and Religion in Indonesia: The Case of Inter-religious 
Dialogue,” in Richard Potz, Sabine Kroissenbrunner and Astrid Hafner (eds), State, 
Law and Religion in Pluralistic Societies – Austrian and Indonesian Experiences (Vienna: Vienna 
University Press, 2010), p. 90. 
15 Ibid., p. 91.  
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between ‘mainstream’ Muslims and Ahmadis. The difference in 
doctrine is offensive enough for some Muslims for it to be described 
as blasphemy and an insult to mainstream Islam – this view is also held 
by the semi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia. M. Amin Djamaluddin of 
the Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam has also been active in 
authoring anti-Ahmadiyah texts such as Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan Al-
Qur’an16 and Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam.17  
In the days after the attacks on Ahmadis in Cikeusik, some leaders 
referred to the belief of Ahmadis as being blasphemous of Islam. (This 
is little debated, for Qadian Ahmadiyah is distinct for its belief in the 
prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.) Elsewhere, in Sabili a 
conservative (and popular) magazine, Ahmadi members are blamed for 
inciting the violence against them. Moreover, they are referred to as 
being intolerant of non-Ahmadis. There has been a rush to be 
considered as ‘tolerant’, as well as a claim to being ‘offended’. 
Discourses regarding religious orthodoxy and deviancy somehow 
become more important than the criminality of three killings 
performed in broad daylight.  
Dialogue, however, might be more useful as a tool to prevent 
violence, rather than to solve cases or ease tensions after grave 
violations of one’s rights has already taken place. Since the killings and 
other attacks, no one has volunteered a statement in which he or she 
acknowledges a kind of complicity in sharpening attitudes against 
Ahmadis. Calls for dialogue, thus, become an effort to avoid 
accountability. Groups that have participated in discursive and physical 
violence against others, should not participate in public ‘dialogues’ 
unless they are willing to acknowledge the violence of their actions and 
words. Ahmadis or others, do not need to validate such calls for 
dialogues, until those who are guilty have faced public and criminal 
censure. 
A Kompas report of 9 March 2011, titled “Segera Gelar Dialog” 
(Quickly Hold a Dialogue) is one such article in which the importance 
of a ‘dialogue’ is emphasised. In this case, the report is covering the 
demands of various religious leaders –Franz Magnis-Suseno, Gomar 
                                          
16 M. Amin Djamaluddin, Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan Al-Qur’ran (Jakarta: Lembaga 
Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2000).  
17 M. Amin Djamaluddin, Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan 
Pengkajian Islam, 2000). 
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Gultom, Salahuddin Wahid and Benny Susetyo. In this article 
Salahuddin Wahid ‘reminds’ the Minister for Religious Affairs 
(Suryadharma Ali) of his promise to hold a dialogue after the killings in 
Cikeusik. Wahid stated that  
Hopefully that dialogue will be implemented. There are 
many accusations being made against the Ahmadiyah that 
need to be confirmed so that there are no 
misunderstandings.18 
A report in Kompas on 19 March 2011 also re-iterated the 
importance of a dialogue between Muslims and non-Ahmadiyah 
Muslims. The report is titled “Pemerintah Perlu Fasilitasi Dialog” (The 
Government Needs to Facilitate a Dialogue). This report covered 
comments made by Bahtiar Effendy, an academic based at UIN Syarif 
Hidayatullah in Jakarta. On this occasion, Effendy cautioned the 
government against issuing new laws and that the government should 
reject all forms of violence by holding to the laws that are already in 
existence.  
Nonetheless, the calls for Ahmadiyah representatives to participate 
in a dialogue were unheeded. The representatives of Ahmadiyah did 
not attend the ‘dialogue’ that was held on 22nd March 2011. They 
rejected the invitation based on their opinion that it would be aimed at 
‘discrediting their beliefs’.19 In rejecting the dialogue, a representative 
from the Legal Aid Foundation, Erna Ratnaningsih stated as follows: 
Even though members of civil society groups were there, 
the Ahmadis fear they would be cornered, as happened in a 
2007 dialogue. Many of the people participating in the 
dialogue are in favour of those who want Ahmadiyah to be 
disbanded.20 
Moreover, Ratnaningsih also stated their rejection was also related 
to the terms and framing of the proposed dialogue: 
We want a neutral mediator and participants. [The current] 
composition, regardless of NGOs, would only bring the 
                                          
18 The above is my translation. The original is as follows: “Semoga dialog itu bisa 
dilaksanakan. Banyak tuduhan terhadap Jemaat Ahmadiyah yang perlu dikonfirmasi agar tidak 
terjadi kesalahpahaman.”  
19 See “Ahmadiyah Skips ’Biased, Unfair’ Govt-initiated Dialogue,” The Jakarta Post, 23 
March, 2011.  
20 As quoted in “Ahmadiyah Skips.”   
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matter into the perspective of religion…What we want is a 
dialogue about Ahmadiyah congregations’ constitutional 
rights as citizens. Don’t judge them on their faith.21 
Ratnaningsih’s point is important as it is an attempt to shift the 
terms of ‘dialogue’ away from ‘belief’ and ‘faith’ to matters of 
citizenship. Those against Ahmadiyah are arguing against their right to 
believe in particular ideas while Ahmadis and those who defend them 
argue that they have a right to believe in their religion. Dialogue  has 
not represented an opportunity for a solving or overcoming of a 
mutual misunderstanding, but has represented an opportunity for 
further marginalisation of a minority religious group. 
The MUI and Ahmadiyah 
As well as dialogues, ‘the law’ has also represented an opportunity 
to further marginalise a minority group: in this case, the Ahmadis 
(whether they be of the Qadian or Lahore schools). A fatwa>, a non-
binding legal opinion, was issued by the MUI against Ahmadiyah 
belief. Secondly, the Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB, Joint Ministerial 
Decree) of 2008 also targeted Ahmadiyah. The fatwa>s issued against 
Ahmadis have been documented in Rofiqoh22, while ICG23 and 
Crouch24 have looked at the different laws that have targeted 
Ahmadiyah. A study that looks at the intersection of law with freedom 
of religion can be found in Al-Khanif’s book, Hukum dan Kebebasan 
Beragama.25 Lindsey has also spoken of how the law is being used to 
marginalise Ahmadiyah.26 Al Khanif’s book includes a short chapter on 
the SKB.27 This SKB has been used widely by conservative groups as a 
legitimising tool for their actions, threats, or violence against Ahmadis.  
The MUI issued a fatwa> against Ahmadiyah in July 2005. The fatwa> 
from the MUI is (1) The Ahmadiyah sect is a group that is outside 
Islam. It is mislead and is misleading. The people who follow it are 
                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Rofiqoh, “The Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama.”   
23 ICG, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah. 
24 Crouch, “Ahmadiyah in Indonesia,” pp. 56-57. 
25 Al Khanif, Hukum dan Kebebasan Beragama di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LaksBang 
Mediatama, 2010).  
26 See “Interview with Tim Lindsey.”  
27 Al Khanif, Hukum, pp. 260-265.  
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murtads (apostates)–they have left Islam, (2) As such, with the law 
regarding apostasy (murtad), the MUI implores those who follow the 
Ahmadiyah sect to return to Islamic teachings in accordance with the 
Qur’a>n and H{adi>th (al-ruju>`  ila> al-h}aqq), (3) The implementation of the 
relevant points of the fatwa> in regards to the banning of Ahmadiyah in 
the Republic of Indonesia must be co-ordinated with the relevant 
parties. The government as the u>li> al-amr has the responsibility to 
implement the fatwa>. The MUI does not condone any action that 
damages another, or ‘anarchist’ actions towards others, property or 
activities that are not in accordance with this MUI’s fatwa>.28  
Assyaukanie regards this fatwa> as one that may generate “intolerant 
actions or violent attitudes”.29 He also asserts that “the MUI’s fatwa> has 
been a powerful tool to discredit Ahmadiyah members and their 
activities in Indonesia.”30  
As Rofiqoh has argued, this fatwa> is in opposition to the 
Indonesian constitution, which guarantees freedom of belief. Rofiqoh 
writes that ‘[this fatwa>] clearly shows intolerance towards the Ahmadis, 
since it entails that the Ahmadis have no right to live in any part of 
Indonesia as long as they consider themselves to be followers of either 
the Qadian or Lahore branch’.31 Rofiqoh asserts that the fatwa> ‘violates 
the Constitution article no.28e point 2 which admits the freedom of 
each citizen to adhere to a certain belief, to express his/her thoughts in 
accordance with his/her conscience’.32 As such, this is an example of 
where a semi-official organisation such as the MUI interfered with 
matters that should be protected by the state.  
The SKB and Restrictions of Religious Freedom 
The SKB has also been used against the Ahmadis. At a 
presentation at the Asian Law Centre at The University of Melbourne, 
Adnan Buyung Nasution told how he was one of the formulators of 
the SKB.33 He narrated that issuing the SKB in which Ahmadiyah is 
                                          
28 This is my translation that comes from the document, ‘Penjelasan tentang Fatwa 
Aliran Ahmadiyah’. This is available from the MUI website at: www.mui.or.id 
29 Assyaukanie, “Fatwa,” p. 7. 
30 Ibid., p. 9. 
31 Rofiqoh, “The Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama,” p. 72. 
32 Ibid. 
33 This event was held at the Asian Law Centre, on April 5, 2011.  
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not banned, but, has its practices restricted was the compromise he 
could make with the Minister of Religious Affairs, Justice Minister, and 
the Interior Minister. Throughout the course of the discussion, 
Nasution stated that representatives of Ahmadiyah had not been 
consulted prior to the release of the SKB. Nasution has recently been 
active in defending members of Ahmadiyah against their persecution. 
He has argued that the ‘intention’ of the SKB was to prevent further 
acts of violence against Ahmadis. Crouch also refers to the justification 
for the SKB in similar terms.34 The intention, however, is irrelevant, 
for it restricts the freedom of Ahmadis to practice their religion as they 
wish (which is guaranteed by the Indonesian constitution). Moreover, 
the government is forbidden to intervene in a manner that is 
discriminatory, as such actions are illegal under international law.35 Al 
Khanif describes the SKB as follows:  
[it bans all] manifestations and Ahmadiyah teachings. It 
warns and orders citizens to not talk about, promote or 
seek support to perform interpretations of a religion that is 
followed in Indonesia, or to perform religious activities that 
are similar to that religion.36  
The issuing of the decree was met with muted criticism from 
various Islamic organisations. Indeed, it was supported by many of the 
hardline groups such as FPI, Forum Umat Islam (Forum of Muslim 
Communities), Hizb Ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, The Indonesian 
Liberty Party), Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI, The 
Institute for the Study and Research of Islam) and Forum Umat Ulama 
Indonesia (FUUI, Forum of Indonesian Muslim Communities and 
Scholars). These groups all played a role in pressing the government 
and the MUI to issue the SKB. Some members of the Indonesian 
parliament and legislature also supported the decree and called for its 
socialisation.37 The ICG points out that although most Muslim leaders 
are very quick to condemn acts of violence, there is greater difficulty, 
or indeed, reluctance to challenge ‘radical positions’ through mobilising 
their masses. The ICG report ends optimistically:  
                                          
34 Crouch, “Ahmadiyah in Indonesia,” p. 57.  
35 Al Khanif, Hukum, p. 260.  
36 Ibid., p. 262. 
37 Ibid., p. 261. 
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The decree on Ahmadiyah is a step backward for 
Indonesia, but if it galvanises pro-democracy activists and 
constitutional defenders into action, there may yet be some 
positive outcome.38  
Similarly to Husein’s optimism regarding possibilities for ‘deep 
dialogue’, there seems to be little positive outcome from the SKB. It 
has received much criticism in interviews conducted by Budhy 
Munawar-Rachman and his team,39 yet, the violence and efforts of 
radical groups have given little consolation to those who are relying on 
‘moderate’ and ‘tolerant’ Muslim discourses to prevail. It is also worth 
considering to what degree liberal Muslim discourse has an effect in 
countering conservative and antagonistic discourse that may have 
greater popular appeal.  
Uncertain Directions 
In the wake of the killings in Cikeusik, the provinces of East Java, 
West Java and South Sulawesi have banned the practice of Ahmadis. 
These laws are curious as they seemingly go against the laws that are 
part of the UUD 1945 that state that each citizen is able to hold his or 
her belief in accordance with their wishes. It seems that these 
governors, however susceptible they are to different political interests, 
are willing to give in to the demands of different radical groups. Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono of Yogyakarta, however, has rejected the calls for 
such a ban. Fauzi Bowo, after earlier saying that “whatever happens to 
Ahmadis is up to God” and that he was considering such a ban, has 
also not followed the proscriptive decrees of other governors.  
Instead of moving to protect Ahmadis from further discrimination 
and violent attacks, the state through laws issued at the provincial level 
have provided more room for discrimination against Ahmadis. Groups 
such as FPI and FUUI have not been held accountable either for their 
roles in attacks on Ahmadis or for their violently discriminatory 
discourse against other citizens. Hate-speech is normal when talking 
about Ahmadiyah. So, the state is present and laws are being created. 
These laws, however, have followed the demands of ‘the mob’, rather 
than referring back to the authority of the UUD 1945 and the other 
national ideologies, which state ‘unity in diversity’ and ‘social justice for 
all’.  
                                          
38 ICG, Indonesia: Implications of the Ahmadiyah, p. 17. 
39 See Munawar-Rachman (ed.), Membela Kebebasan Beragama. 
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The clashes between a self-proclaimed mainstream Muslim 
majority and that of a minority Muslim sect (Ahmadiyah) are 
representative of a conflict between ‘the orthodox’ and ‘un-orthodox’. 
The orthodox and those who claim to be so are unwilling to accept 
those who divert from what is considered to be ‘the true’ or ‘the real’ 
Islam. This is seen clearly in recent attempts to re-convert Ahmadis 
away from their chosen faith and back to ‘the real’, ‘the right’ and ‘the 
true’ Islam. In such an instance, the orthodox clearly consider 
themselves to be the paternal representatives who know what is best 
for the infantile ‘other’ who has strayed from ‘the straight path’. 
More generally, this clash between orthodox and un-orthodox is 
seen in the broad division between Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU). As a modernist organisation, Muhammadiyah has been 
responsible for much social change and reform. Nonetheless, a 
modernist bent also lends itself to a strict interpretation of what is 
logical, linear, right and true. As such, there is little tolerance of those 
practices that are part of tradition, or, of a society’s pre-Islamic 
practices.  
NU, generally described as a ‘traditionalist’ organisation, however, 
has more room to accept practices long accepted into local custom. 
Whether it is acts of pilgrimage to the graves of the Sembilan Wali, or 
a strong study of the Kitab Kuning, NU is seen as representing an 
Islam that is somewhat between Islamic and Indonesian traditions; or 
in the words of the late Abdurrahman Wahid, an Indonesian-isation of 
Islam. Wahid’s emphasis on and the practice of visiting others from 
other social groups–bersilahturrahmi–is a legacy of great example. Here, 
Wahid’s practice created a kind of Islamic pluralism, without having to 
express it in terms considered to have come from a ‘western’ 
discourse.  
Conclusion 
A negotiation of values between what is considered ‘Islamic’ and 
‘Indonesian’ or between what is ‘orthodox’ and ‘un-orthodox’ was 
strikingly absent on that morning of February 6, 2011. It was a 
moment when ‘dialogue’ was no longer possible. It was a moment for 
violence and rejection of the other. Decrees at the provincial level have 
further normalised violence against Ahmadis. A dialogue ‘after the fact’ 
will not solve anything until the injustices against this particular 
minority are recognised. It is not the time for a dialogue, but the time 
for openness and arguments: where people are willing to accept the 
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legitimacy of others to hold their beliefs. Until guilt and culpability is 
established, a monologue of violence – both physical and discursive – 
will persist. [] 
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